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Abstract 
 
 The primary purpose of this research is to assess the practicality of utilizing some 
of the financial derivative products available on the market today in an effort to mitigate 
monetary losses due to the increasing price of jet fuel, thereby increasing stability in the 
DOD budget.  The scope of this research will focus on the use of futures and call option 
contracts.  Domestic jet fuel expenditure data was collected for Fiscal Years 1996 to 2007 
and cross-referenced with the contract process of the previously mentioned financial 
hedging instruments during the same period of time.   
 Results from the ex post facto analysis indicate that hedging with either heating 
oil futures or heating oil call options would have provided a tremendous overall savings 
to the DoD.  Currently the DoD does not hedge its budget against fluctuation in the jet 
fuel spot market.  The implication from this study is that the DoD should consider 
hedging its jet fuel exposure with either derivative, in particular call options as it is 
tailored for risk adverse customers.   
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JET FUEL HEDGING STRATEGIES FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
THROUGH USE OF FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES 
 
I.  Introduction 
Overview 
 Oil is one of the most important commodities on the global stage today and the 
United States consumed nearly 24.8 percent of the global supply in 2006 (EIA, 2008).  It 
is the lifeblood of the global economy and the keystone asset required to sustain every 
industrialized nation.  From being a factor in deciding what form of transportation we 
will use for travel to our National Defense Strategy; oil is everywhere in our lives.  
Consumption data from the Energy Information Agency (EIA) illustrates that as of 26 
September 2008, the United States consumes roughly 18.5 million barrels per day of 
petroleum-based products.  This consumption quantity is nearly eight percent lower from 
the 20.2 million barrels per day quantity taken from the same time in 2007.  Price is a 
major factor in driving oil consumption and the average price for per barrel increased 
substantially from 2007 to 2008.  In 2007, the average price per barrel of crude oil was 
trading for nearly 72 dollars and in 2008, the price increased to all most 150 dollars per 
barrel before the September crash.  This statistic clearly demonstrates the impact that 
price has on the demand of petroleum-based products and the importance of oil in our 
everyday lives.  
 Over the past five years, the price per barrel of crude oil has grown dramatically.  
This price increase has created record-high prices for all by-products of crude oil, 
including Aviation Fuel, otherwise known as jet fuel.  To put this into perspective, in 
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FY02, the Department of Defense (DoD) procured roughly 1.9 billion gallons of jet fuel 
on the domestic spot market at a total cost of nearly 1.3 billion dollars.  In comparison, 
the DoD procured 1.5 billion gallons of jet fuel on the same spot market at a total cost 
that was slightly over 3 billion dollars in FY07 (DESC, 2008).  Ultimately, this means 
that in FY07 the DoD purchased 80 percent of the jet fuel that it used in FY02 for a cost 
that was 230 percent higher.  
 Large price fluctuations in the crude oil market make the price of crude extremely 
volatile.  Considering that jet fuel is a by-product of crude oil, there is a high correlation 
between the price of crude oil and jet fuel.  The spot market price of jet fuel and the 
futures price of crude oil have a correlation factor of 0.9964.  Figure 1 illustrates this 
correlation over the past twelve years, data obtained from the EIA. 
 
Figure 1.  Commodity Price Correlation 
 Derived from crude oil, jet fuel goes through a refining process to achieve its final 
usable state.  This refining cost causes the price of jet fuel to be slightly higher than the 
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price of crude oil.  Due to its derivative relationship with crude oil, many of the same 
factors that drive the crude oil market affect the price of jet fuel.  Commercial airlines 
mitigate their exposure to the crude oil market by using a fuel hedge and many believe 
that it would be prudent for the DoD to implement a similar strategy.  This paper will 
examine some of the strategies available to the DoD that could help reduce its exposure 
to the high volatility associated with the price of jet fuel.  With a reduction in exposure to 
price volatility, the Defense Energy Support Center (DESC) should be able to provide the 
DoD with a stable jet fuel price, this is currently not the case. 
Current Procedures  
 Currently the DESC procures all of the jet fuel used by the DoD throughout the 
fiscal year.  DESC utilized the Defense Working Capital Fund (DWCF) to purchase more 
than 132 million barrels of fuel at a cost of 11.5 billion dollars in 2007 (DESC, 2008).  
The DWCF is a revolving fund that provides goods and services for the component 
military forces.  DWCF Business Areas sell goods or services with the intent of 
recovering the total cost incurred.  Unlike profit-oriented commercial businesses, DWCF 
Business Areas strive to break even over the long term, and set prices accordingly. 
Allowing the DWCF to operate at a loss one year and then a profit the next creates a zero 
sum gain.  The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Comptroller establishes a 
stabilized standard price for aviation fuel, relying heavily upon Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB) forecasted crude oil prices.  This standard price is to provide the 
military with budget stability using the DWCF reserves to absorb any volatility in the 
market.  Over the past five years, the DWCF has had a difficult time in providing stable 
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fuel prices to the DoD, causing a great deal budget instability for the armed services.  
Figure 2 shows the historical DESC standard price and the historical spot price of jet fuel 
from October 1995 to August 2008.  
 
Figure 2.  Historical Jet Fuel & DESC Standard Price Comparison 
 Prior to FY05, DESC provided a stable price to the DoD, only changing the 
standard price at the beginning of every fiscal year.  However, starting in FY05 price 
volatility has forced DESC to change the standard price for jet fuel during the fiscal year.  
This adjustment in price makes it increasingly difficult for the services to budget 
appropriately for jet fuel, forcing the services to rely on Congressional supplemental 
funding in order to maintain mission readiness.   In light of this escalating problem, OMB 
has urged the DoD to develop a strategy to include fuel hedging in its risk-control arsenal 
to deal with rampant prices of aviation fuel (Defense Business Board, 2004).  Providing a 
stabilized standard fuel price is supposed to be one of strengths of the DWCF but this 
does not seem to be the case.  To highlight this point, every year since 1992 Congress has 
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adjusted either the budget-year fuel prices or appropriated additional funding to meet 
shortfalls (Chinn, Le Blanc, & Corbion, 2001).  High price volatility has been the major 
driving force in underperforming forecasts in recent years.  This volatility has caused the 
forecast to be grossly inaccurate and ultimately forced DESC to alter the standard price of 
fuel during the fiscal year.  A 2002 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report 
examining fuel pricing concluded, “DoD has been trying to successfully implement the 
working capital fund concept for over 50 years.  However, Congress has repeatedly noted 
weaknesses in DoD’s ability to use this mechanism to effectively control costs and 
operate in a business-like fashion” (GAO, 2002).   Due to market volatility, the DWCF 
can either underestimate or overestimate the market strength each year.  A scenario of 
insufficient funding is realized when the market is underestimated and there is high price 
volatility, leaving the DWCF unable to sustain itself.  This forces DESC to change the 
standard price of fuel mid-year and share the increased burden with the DoD.   In turn, 
the Services scramble for additional funding or take money from other programs to pay 
for the increase in fuel price (OSD, 2006).  When the market is overestimated, then there 
is less money available for investment.  Ultimately, current practices do not enable the 
DoD to plan and budget more confidently, in accordance with the DWCF’s mandate.  
Commercial Sector 
 The DoD is not the only consumer of aviation fuel that has endured these cost 
increases, the commercial airline industry has suffered as well.  For every one-dollar per 
barrel increase in aviation fuel, the airlines collectively pay 425 million dollars in 
additional operating costs.  Realizing this, a majority of the airlines have developed risk 
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management strategies to hedge a portion of their jet fuel needs for future use.  Since 
September 11, 2001, Southwest Airlines is the most notable commercial carrier to 
implement a fuel hedge strategy and they are the only major US airline that consistently 
turns a profit (Alexander, 2004). 
 Southwest owes a great deal of its recent success to their fuel hedge strategy; it 
maintains a long-term fuel hedge program to keep its costs down.  Within its fuel hedge 
portfolio, Southwest has purchased fuel options for years in advance to smooth out 
fluctuations in fuel costs.  While hedging has provided a great deal of success in the past 
for Southwest, the recent decrease in the price per barrel of oil is forcing Southwest to 
realize a higher cost per gallon for fuel than its un-hedged competitors.  Since Southwest 
uses a variety of derivatives to hedge, this increased cost will likely be marginal and 
equal only the premium amount associated with the contract.     
 In 2000, Southwest said it had "adjusted its hedging strategy" to "utilize financial 
derivative instruments... when it appears the Company can take advantage of market 
conditions" (SEC, 2001).  Additionally, the company hoped to "take advantage of 
historically low jet fuel prices” (SEC, 2001).  Southwest's foresight on the market 
positioned them to make profit windfalls in the following years. Southwest utilized a 
mixture of swaps and call options to secure fuel for future years while paying prices they 
believed were historically low.  Prior to this change in strategy, Southwest hoped for 
reduced volatility in oil prices, just like a vast majority of other airlines.  However, with 
the hedge in place, they now hoped for high prices and they got what they wanted.  
Higher prices allowed Southwest to capitalize off their investment and have a competitive 
advantage when setting fare prices.  The use of fuel hedging helped Southwest maintain 
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its profitability during the oil shocks related to the Iraq War and during the aftermath of 
Hurricane Katrina.  According to the 2006 Southwest Annual report, on average 
Southwest paid less for a barrel of jet fuel than the Spot Market price from 2003 to 2006 
because of its fuel hedge (SEC, 2006).  Table 1 depicts the Southwest and Spot Market 
average annual price per gallon for jet fuel from 2003 to 2006.   The delta represents the 
average amount of savings per gallon that Southwest obtained because of its hedged 
position.       
Table 1.  Southwest versus Spot Market Annual Price per Gallon 
Year Southwest Average Price Spot Market Average Price  Delta 
2003 $0.73  $0.87  $0.13  
2004 $0.83  $1.20  $0.37  
2005 $1.03  $1.72  $0.68  
2006 $1.53  $1.95  $0.42  
 
 At the conclusion of 2007, Southwest Airlines had a 95 percent hedged position in 
place at a price of 50 dollars per barrel; this position will decrease substantially moving 
forward.  According to the Wall Street Journal as of October 2007 Southwest Airlines 
had the hedge positions shown in Table 2.  Table 2 shows the price per barrel that 
Southwest already maintains for its forecasted consumption amount for each year.   Using 
2008 as an example year, Southwest had 65 percent of its projected fuel consumption 
hedged at a cost of 49 dollars per barrel.   
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Table 2.  Southwest Fuel Hedge Position 
 
Year Position Price per Barrel 
2008 65% $49.00  
2009 50% $51.00  
2010 25% $63.00  
2011 15% $64.00  
2012 15% $63.00  
 
In light of the current fluctuations in the oil market, these amounts could change 
significantly in the near future.  
Problem Statement 
 Due to the erratic fluctuations in price for aviation fuel on the spot market over 
the past several years, the DoD has had to allocate additional financial resources to cover 
these unexpected costs creating unanticipated shortfalls during the current fiscal year 
Research Question 
 The focus of this research is to determine the practicality and potential outcomes 
of utilizing two unique financial derivatives to reduce DoD financial losses caused from 
the increasing price of jet fuel.  This research utilizes an ex post facto methodology, 
based off DoD cost and consumption data from Fiscal Year 96 to Fiscal Year 09.  This 
analysis uses secondary cost data for two forms of financial derivatives covering the 
same period.  We are going to compare how much the DoD did pay with the net amount 
it would have paid had a fuel hedging strategy been in place.   
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Significance 
 The significance of this research is that the DoD could potentially mitigate its 
exposure to the volatility of the crude oil market by implementing a hedging program.  
This reduction in exposure to price fluctuations could lead to a reduction of monetary 
losses due to the increased price of jet fuel on the spot market in the long run.  There is a 
potential for millions of dollars in annual savings for the DoD.  The DoD could use these 
savings to sustain mission operations reduce the need for supplemental funding.  
Assumptions 
 One of the main assumptions of this research is that the world energy market 
contains enough liquidity to allow DoD entry into these markets without significantly 
influencing the price of the underlying derivative.   
Chapter Summary 
This study attempts to leverage off historical commodity cost data to create mock 
fuel hedging scenarios, determining if a financial savings could have be realized in the 
Department of Defense had a hedge strategy been implemented.  To develop these 
scenarios, we use an ex-post facto methodology on the recorded commodity cost data 
over the past decade.  The study uses recorded jet fuel spot prices as well as heating oil 
futures and call option prices.  While the Department of Defense must procure fuel 
regardless the cost, this study seeks to reduce the total cost spent on fuel over the lifetime 
of the analysis and provide a greater base for budgetary stability for the armed services.   
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II.  Literature Review 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter provides an overview of the research previously completed involving 
fuel hedging.   We first describe terminology, concepts and instruments used in this study 
along with previous qualitative fuel hedging and quantitative currency hedging studies 
done.  Covering risk management next and then some legal issues involving fuel hedging.  
From the information gathered in this chapter, we develop a historical and logical 
framework for the ex-post facto methodology scenario.  
Terminology, Concepts and Instruments 
The world of finance has its own unique language that is foreign to most 
individuals; this portion of the literature review will cover the terminology and concepts 
of the financial world that are required to understand this paper 
Derivatives 
The primary purpose of a derivative is to transfer risk from one party to another.  
A derivative is a financial instrument whose value is determined from either a cash 
market commodity, futures contract, or other financial instrument.  Common types of 
derivatives include forwards, futures, options and swaps contracts (CME, 2006).   
Futures Contract 
Standardized forward contracts gave birth to today’s futures contract.  A futures 
contract is simply a standardized legally binding agreement between a buyer and seller in 
which the contract specifies the quantity, predetermined price, and future delivery date of 
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the purchased commodity.  The two main types of future contracts are physical delivery 
and cash settled.  For a physical delivery contract, to settle open positions (positions not 
yet offset in the marketplace) in the market an offsetting futures trade or acceptance 
physical delivery is required.  On the other hand, closing a cash-settled future contract 
position requires the seller to make an offsetting futures trade or simply leaving it alone 
and make one final mark-to-market settlement adjustment to close the position.  
According to the Chicago Board of Trade, only 3 percent of all futures contracts result in 
physical delivery or cash settlement, offsetting the other 97 percent on the market.   This 
means that the majority of participants close out their positions prior to the contract’s 
delivery date.  If liquidation of these contracts does not occur by the last trading day of 
the contract month, comparing the position’s price with a special final settlement price to 
either debit or credit the position is required before closing it out (CME, 2006). 
Traded easily as standardized contracts, futures contracts may exchange 
ownership numerous times before the specified delivery date.  It is in these exchanges of 
ownership that “speculating” takes place.   
Forward Contract 
A forward contract otherwise known as a cash forward sale is a private 
negotiation between a buyer and seller in the present that establishes the price and 
quantity of a commodity for delivery at a specified time in the future.  Once delivered to 
the buyer, the commodity changes hands of ownership and payment is settled.    Forward 
contracts differ from futures contracts by allowing payments to occur on a daily basis, 
enabling partial payments over the life of the contract.  This type of instrument was 
 
12 
particularly useful to merchants and farmers in the mid 1800s because it enabled them to 
lock in prices for a future delivery date, allowing them to hedge against price volatility in 
the market.  To prevent either party involved in the trade from defaulting on the 
transaction, both parties are required to deposit a negotiated amount to a third party for 
holding until settlement.  If one party breaks the agreement and defaults on the contract, 
the other member receives the deposited amount as compensation (CME, 2006). 
Exercise 
The action or ability of the buyer of an options contract to buy or sell the 
underlying futures contract.  An option holder is the only individual who can exercise an 
option.  Call holders can exercise the option to buy and put holders can exercise the 
option to sell the underlying future (NYMEX, 2004).  
Strike Price 
A strike price is the price at which the holder may exercise the option.  
Established when the option is first written, it along with time until expiration, volatility 
of the underlying security, and the current interest rate determines the premium amount to 
be paid for the option.  For call options, the strike price is the purchase price of the 
commodity.  For a put option, the strike price is the selling price of the commodity 
(NYMEX, 2004).     
Premium 
The price paid by the buyer to the seller in addition to the amount the futures price 
of the commodity.  For example, if heating oil futures are trading for 80 dollars a barrel 
and call options are being sold for 83 dollars a barrel then the call option would have a 
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three-dollar premium associated with it.  The premium amount is the penalty the buyer 
will have to pay to the seller if they decide to let the contract expire instead of exercising 
the contract.   
A variety of factors affect the monetary value of option premiums, including 
strike price as it relates to the underlying futures price, time until contract expiration and 
market volatility (NYMEX, 2004). 
Underlying Futures Contract 
The underlying is the price of the corresponding futures contract for that 
commodity.  The September heating oil commodity contract is the underlying contract 
for September heating oil call and put options (NYMEX, 2004). 
Volatility 
Volatility is high in an environment where prices are rising or falling 
significantly.  Alternatively, when a futures contract shows little price movement or 
increased stability, volatility is low.  Commodities that experience high volatility garner 
higher premiums on their options on futures contracts.  Increased price stability coupled 
with decreased volatility environments generally cause options premiums to decline.  
Volatility coupled with time until expiration, strike price, and the current interest rate 
determines the premium amount for the option (NYMEX, 2004). 
In-the-money 
Having positive intrinsic economic value, a call option is in the money when the 
commodity futures price exceeds the option’s strike price.  For example, a December 
heating oil call option is in the money if the December strike price were beneath the 
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futures trading price.  Enabling the option holder the ability to exercise the contract and 
obtain the commodity at a value less than the market rate (NYMEX, 2004). 
At-the-money 
Having neither positive nor negative intrinsic economic value, an option is at-the-
money when the futures price and the strike price are equal to one another (NYMEX, 
2004). 
Out-of-the-money 
Having a negative intrinsic economic value, a call option is out-of-the-money 
when the commodity futures price is less than the option’s strike price while a put is out-
of-the-money when the commodities futures price is above the option's strike price 
(NYMEX, 2004). 
Call Option Contract 
Call option futures contracts provide the buyer the right to purchase the 
underlying futures contract at an agreed upon strike price; but it does not obligate them to 
do so.  This instrument does obligate the seller to sell the underlying if the buyer chooses 
to exercise the call option.  The buyer pays a premium for the option, compensating the 
investor for the risk associated with fluctuations in the price of the underlying stock or 
commodity.  From an investors perspective, the buyer of a call wants the value of the 
underlying to increase after they have purchased the option because then they will make a 
profit off their investment (CME, 2006). 
Call options on futures contracts differ from typical futures contracts in that they 
provide the buyer with a way out of the contract that only costs the buyer the amount of 
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the premium.  The following example highlights the differences between the two types of 
contacts a buyer face when purchasing heating oil contracts.  Assume that a barrel of 
heating oil is trading for 80 dollars per barrel on the futures market.  Buyer 1 purchases a 
futures contract for 80 dollars per barrel; buyer 2 purchases a call option on the futures 
contract for 80 dollars per barrel plus a 3-dollar premium, totaling 83 dollars per barrel.  
Both contracts are for the same quantity of heating oil and expire at the same time.  After 
some time goes by both contracts reach their expiration date and heating oil is now 
trading for 70 dollars per barrel.  In this scenario, buyer 1 would be forced to pay the 
agreed upon 80 dollars per barrel even though the current price of heating oil is now only 
70 dollars per barrel.  Buyer 2, on the other hand, would simply let their contract expire 
and forfeit the premium amount of 3 dollars per barrel. Then they would purchase heating 
oil at the prevailing market-rate of 70 dollars per barrel, making 73 dollars per barrel their 
total cost.  In this scenario both buyers obtained the same amount of heating oil but buyer 
one ended up paying 7 dollars more per barrel than buyer two for the same amount of the 
heating oil.  Buyer 1 paid 7 dollars more than buyer 2 because buyer one paid 80 dollars 
per barrel instead of 73 dollars per barrel when they purchased their contract.   
Now let us use this same scenario but this time, at the time of expiration, heating 
oil is trading for 90 dollars per barrel.  Buyer 1 is happy that they purchased their contract 
when heating oil was trading for 80 dollars per barrel and gladly pays the agreed upon 80 
dollars per barrel.  Buyer 2 feels good about this situation as well, because they can 
exercise their call option to purchase heating oil at 83 dollars per barrel; in this scenario, 
both buyers come out ahead.  Buyer 1 is the bigger winner and saves 10 dollars per 
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barrel.  Since buyer 2 paid 83 dollars per barrel for a commodity that is trading for 90 
dollars per barrel, they save 7 dollars per barrel.   
So far we have seen how beneficial call options can be for a consumer, but there 
are scenarios where that is not the case.  Assume that heating oil is trading for 82 dollars 
per barrel at contract expiration.  Buyer 1 simply pays their agreed 80 dollars per barrel 
price and saves 2 dollars per barrel.  Buyer 2 will choose to execute their call option and 
pay 83 dollars per barrel, putting them in a situation where they are paying 1 dollar more 
than fair market value for heating oil.  Buyer 2 chooses to execute their option instead of 
letting it expire because of the 3-dollar premium associated with the call option.  If buyer 
2 had let the contract expire it would have forced them to purchase heating oil at 82 
dollars per barrel off the spot market.  This 82-dollar per barrel price plus the 3-dollar per 
barrel premium cost would make their total cost equal 85 dollars per barrel.  In either 
situation buyer two is paying more per barrel than the fair market value.   
Hedge 
The undertaking of either a either a long or short position by purchasing futures 
contracts or options contracts in order to mitigate exposure to price volatility.  For 
example, the purchase of heating oil futures contracts in July that is set to expire in 
December (NYMEX, 2004). 
If you are “going long” then you are a holder who has established a market 
position by purchasing futures or options contracts with the anticipation that prices of the 
underlying commodities will increase.  From a profit perspective, a holder who maintains 
a long position will profit if the price of the underlying security increases.  A holder of a 
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short position profits off a decrease in price for the underlying security.  Consumers that 
make bulk purchases such as electric companies, manufacturing companies, gasoline 
station owners and other high volume buyers feel the need to protect themselves against 
high acquisition cost.  By taking a long position, companies can manage their exposure to 
increasing prices by implementing this type of strategy (CME, 2006). 
Similar Studies 
 The topic of fuel hedging has garnered many headlines over the past five years, 
most of which can be contributed to the successful hedging strategy implemented by 
Southwest airlines.  Recognizing the success of Southwest and potential benefit that 
could be gained by fuel hedging, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) urged the 
Department of Defense (DoD) in 2004 to develop a strategy to include fuel hedging in its 
risk-control arsenal to deal with the rampant prices of aviation fuel (Defense Business 
Board, 2004).  Despite this recommendation from OMB, there has been little analytical 
research done in this arena by the DoD.  The November 2006 edition of the Air Force 
Journal of Logistics, the article “Fuel Hedging, A Lesson from the Airlines” by Lawrence 
Spinetta highlighted the impact that volatility in the jet fuel price can have on the Air 
Force budget.  Spinetta advocated for the implementation of a fuel-hedging program 
within the DoD (Spinetta, 2004).  In March 2008 a Naval Post graduate Thesis titled 
“Should the Department of Defense Hedge Oil Prices In Order To Save Money” written 
by James Knapp suggested that the DoD should not enter into a hedging position due to 
the negative public perception, inherent risk in hedging, and the lack of political support 
(Knapp, 2008).  Both of these studies make compelling arguments for their respective 
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positions on the topic, but neither provides any analytical support to bolster their 
argument.  Although there has not been any quantitative research done on fuel hedging 
from a DoD position, there has been published quantitative research done on currency 
hedging.   
Groshek and Felli (2000) ran a Monte Carlo simulation to determine the effects of 
hedging the Air Force Overseas Operations and Maintenance budget in the Japanese Yen, 
British Pound or German Mark.  Of all of the hedging methods available, the authors 
chose to use forward and option contracts as their instruments of choice.  The authors 
collected data from 1985 to 1998, providing them with a total 14 years of worth of 
budgetary data.  Their findings showed that using these hedging instruments would 
achieve six to seven percent savings.  They concluded that it would be in the best interest 
of the DoD to utilize a hedging strategy with an emphasis placed on using options 
(Groshek & Felli, 2000).  
Edwards (2008) found that by using futures contracts to hedge against the EURO 
from 2001 to 2007, on average the DOD could have realized 171 million dollars in 
savings.  This certainly emphasizes the importance of exploring the potential of using 
hedges as a technique to increase budget stability (Edwards, 2008).   
Risk Management 
Confronted with the fact that risk is unavoidable when acquiring major weapon 
systems, the DoD has outlined a path for its program managers to follow that will assist 
them in managing risk associated with procuring weapon systems.  The Risk 
Management Guide for DoD Acquisitions identifies risk as, “A measure of future 
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uncertainties in achieving program performance goals and objectives within defined cost, 
schedule and performance constraints” (DAU, 2006).  The basic definition of risk still 
holds true when applied to other large acquisitions, such as the purchase of jet fuel.   
Outside of investor profit maximization, one of the primary purposes of using 
financial derivatives to implement a hedging strategy is to reduce market risk and 
mitigate price volatility.  Dr. Rene Stulz (1996) explores the apparent disconnect between 
the theory and actual practice of corporate risk management.  From a theory perspective, 
companies facing a large amount of exposures to commodity prices can increase their 
market values by using financial derivatives to create a hedge and reduce exposure, with 
the primary emphasis of the hedge being a reduction in price variability.  However, the 
design of most hedging positions taken today is for the “elimination of costly lower-tail 
outcomes -- that is to reduce the expected costs of financial trouble while preserving a 
company’s ability to exploit any comparative advantage in risk-bearing it might have” 
(Stulz, 1996).  As an example of what can happen when a company implements a 
hedging strategy that doesn’t aim at minimizing the variance, Stulz cites the example of 
Metallgesellschaft Refining and Marketing (MGRM) in 1993 (Stulz, 1996).  MGRM 
implemented a strategy that hedged long-term oil commitments on a one-to-one basis 
with short-term futures in 1993, believing they could profit from price movements due to 
their specialized information about supply and demand.  Unfortunately for MGRM, spot 
prices fell dramatically during 1993.  The decline in spot prices led to a financial loss of 
1.25 billion dollars for MGRM, with over 800 million dollars in losses in the fourth 
quarter alone forced MGRM into bankruptcy.  MGRMs downfall illustrates the negative 
consequences of what can happen when a company enters into a hedging strategy based 
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off practice instead of theory.  Had MGRM taken a theory approach to their hedging 
strategy then they would have only had a hedging position that was large enough to 
mitigate their exposure to downward price movement in the oil market.  Instead, MGRM 
practiced aggressive hedging tactics hoping to capitalize off their specialized supply and 
demand information knowledge.     
For another example of what can happen to a company when it does not 
implement a good hedging strategy, you only need to look at the airline industry.  United 
Airlines had roughly 30 percent of its fuel consumption hedged for the first quarter of 
2008 and experienced a 537 million dollar loss compared to Southwest, which had a 70 
percent hedge that enabled it to garner a modest 34 million dollar profit (Gaffen, 2008).  
United Airlines experienced costly financial losses by poorly hedging against what Dr. 
Stultz would call “costly lower tail outcomes”.   The understanding of theory behind risk 
management and the implementation of its policies is critical to any corporation, clearly 
portrayed throughout the literature on the topic.  Hedging exposure to the price volatility 
of jet fuel is one of the ways a company can attempt to minimize its risks. 
The DoD will need to a pursue a hedging strategy that is designed to mitigate 
exposure to price volatility.  This strategy will not introduce speculation or seek to obtain 
additional resources to offset other financial shortfalls.  By practicing a smart hedging 
strategy, the DoD will be able to moderate their exposure to oil price increases and avoid 
it creating instability in the DoD budget.  Increased budgetary stability during a time 
when the DoD could be facing declining budgets is a step in the right direction.    
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Legal Issues 
 The DoD faces three challenges that it must overcome before it can implement a 
fuel hedging strategy.  First, the DoD has no specific authority to engage in transactions 
involving derivative products because the DoD’s general procurement is limited to 
products and services.  Second, the DoD lacks authority to derive cash benefit from 
liquidated positions in financial markets.  Currently, proceeds from liquidated positions 
would go directly to the Treasury rather than into the DWCF.  Third, the General 
Accounting Office (GAO) has not addressed whether hedging budget risk is a “necessary 
expense” for federal agencies.  The necessary expense rule in the 2004 GAO Redbook 
states: 
It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that where an 
appropriation is made for a particular object, by implication it confers 
authority to incur expenses which are necessary or proper or incident to 
the proper execution of the object, unless there is another appropriation 
which makes more specific provision for such expenditures, or unless they 
are prohibited by law, or unless it is manifestly evident from various 
precedent appropriation acts that Congress has specifically legislated for 
certain expenses of the Government creating the implication that such 
expenditures should not be incurred except by its express authority.  
  
If the Comptroller General deemed that fuel hedging was a necessary expense then it 
would be legal.  Currently there is not an established formula for determining the 
application of the necessary expense rule (GAO, 2004). 
Market Implications 
 Due to the large quantity of jet fuel that the DoD procures on the spot market, it is 
feasible that if the DoD did enter into a jet fuel hedging position by using heating oil 
futures, it could increase the value of the heating oil futures contracts on the market.  
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Currently, crude oil accounts for nearly 40 percent of the world’s energy and it is the 
most actively traded physical commodity on the market today (NYMEX, 2007).  Heating 
oil accounts for roughly 25 percent of the yield of a barrel of crude, making it third on the 
list behind gasoline (NYMEX, 2007).  Multiple commercial businesses such as airlines, 
trucking companies and other major consumers of fuel use heating oil to hedge fuel cost 
by actively trading contracts on the market.  Considering the demand for these contracts 
both domestically and abroad, and the size of the market, it is my opinion that if the DoD 
had purchased 120 contracts over ten years, it would probably not have a large impact 
and sway the market in either direction. 
Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, we described several studies that look at fuel hedging and 
currency hedging in the DoD.  From these studies, we derive that hedging can be a useful 
instrument in reducing cost for a multiyear program.  In addition, we covered a plethora 
of terminology, concepts and instruments that used in the financial community.  Finally, 
we looked at the legal barriers that currently exist that prevent the DoD from legally 
implementing a fuel-hedging program and the market implications associated with the 
DoD entering into a hedging position. 
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III.  Methodology 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter describes the process that used to conduct this research.  We begin 
by outlining the data employed by this quantitative study, followed by an explanation of 
how the hedge scenario works for both futures and call option contract.  The last topic 
addressed in this chapter is an explanation of the ex-post facto methodology used to 
perform this study.   
Data Measures 
 DESC provided monthly DoD fuel consumption data for this analysis.  According 
to DESC, the DoD procures roughly 50 percent of its jet fuel on the domestic spot market 
while procuring the other 50 percent on foreign markets.  Some of the fuel obtained off 
the foreign market comes at a discount price and for that reason it was not included in 
this analysis.  The data collected for this analysis provides the total gallons procured on 
the domestic market and the weighted average price per gallon for each specific month 
from October 1995 to September 2007, enabling the study to start in FY96 and conclude 
in FY07.  The provided data represents the historic procurement cost per gallon for fuel 
consumed by the DoD.     
The commercial sector uses both heating oil and crude oil financial derivatives to 
create jet fuel hedging positions, but heating oil derivates are the preferred instrument for 
creating jet fuel hedges (NYMEX, 2007).  In testing the correlation between heating oil 
and jet fuel, I used over three thousand end of day historical prices for both of the 
petroleum-based products and obtained a correlation factor of 0.9983.  This factor was 
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slightly higher than the 0.9964 factor that jet fuel and crude oil shared so; this analysis 
only uses heating oil derivatives as the underlying. 
This study uses heating oil futures data obtained from the Center for Futures 
Trade Commission (CFTC) to match the DESC fuel procurement time frame.  The data 
provided from the CFTC is the settle price for each contract (November through October) 
on the first business day of every fiscal year from FY96 through FY07.  This analysis 
used the end-of-day settle prices to prevent speculation from tampering with the results.  
End-of-day settle prices are closing prices and reflect the amount a stock or commodity 
traded at the close of business for that day.  All futures contracts expire on the last 
business day of the preceding month. For example, the September 2008 futures contract 
expired on 29 August 2008.   
The New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) provided financial data for 
trading the underlying heating oil call option derivatives for the same timeframe.  This 
analysis will try to maintain an “at the money” position when determining the strike and 
settle prices for call options.  Since these are historical data, there are not “at the money” 
prices for every month in every year.  This analysis uses the closest strike price and settle 
price when this occurs.  If no strike price exists for a month, the corresponding DESC 
weighted spot price is used and a hedge will not exist for that month.  There were 9 strike 
and settlement prices missing out of 144 needed to hedge the DoD for the timeframe of 
this analysis.  All call option contracts expire three business days prior to the futures 
expiration date.  For example, the September 2008 call options contract expired on 26 
August 2008, whereas the September 2008 futures contract expires on 29 August 2008. 
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Futures and options contracts were the financial derivatives utilized for this 
analysis.  Although other financial tools such as SWAPs and forwards are available on 
the market to create a hedging position, they are not within the scope of this analysis.  
This analysis used call options contracts instead of put option contracts.  The DoD is a 
not-for-profit entity and using call options to hedge against an increase in the spot price 
of jet fuel is less speculative in nature.  Therefore, any “in the money” gains realized 
from executing a contract would not be perceived as profit but more so as a reduction of 
cost.  The DoD would not accept physical delivery at settlement instead the DoD would s 
use the profit realized from executing the contract to offset the current spot price of jet 
fuel.  By engaging in this practice, the DoD would only use profits to offset fuel costs.    
Transaction costs for purchasing futures and call options on the exchange, as well 
as purchasing jet fuel on the spot market have not been included in this analysis.  For 
purchasing heating oil future or option contracts a buyer realizes NYMEX clearing cost, 
commission fees and brokerage costs.  The culmination of these expenses total between 4 
to 12 dollars per contract traded.  These costs are dependent upon clearing member status, 
the total quantity traded, and the brokerage firm that is executing the trade.  In a situation 
when a consumer executes two contracts (each contract consisting of 42,000 gallons) the 
transaction cost would range from 8 to 24 dollars.  The buyer realizes a profit or loss 
based on the spread between the Bid and Ask price, not the transaction expense.    
Currently, DESC makes multiple purchases of jet fuel on the spot market throughout the 
year.  On many occasions, DESC makes several purchases of jet fuel on a daily basis.  
These transaction cost do not deter DESC from making them in their current structure 
and would not prevent them from making purchases on the commodities trading market.  
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Transactions costs on either the spot or the futures market are simply the cost of doing 
business and are absent from this analysis.   
This analysis used the first day of the fiscal year as the execution date to establish 
the hedging positions, typically the first trading day or business day of October.  As 
stated before, the closing or settle price on the underlying contract was chosen rather than 
the open, high, or low price of the day; removing the effect of speculation.  With the 
fiscal year starting in October, contracts in the corresponding fiscal year were chosen 
with expiration dates in November, December, January, February, March, April, May, 
June, July, August, September and October.  To cover all of the months by this hedging 
position, the purchase of October contracts for the next fiscal year at the same time as the 
other monthly contracts was completed.  An example of this would be purchasing an 
October 2007 contract in October 2006.  For the first fiscal year, this analysis uses the 
DESC purchase price for jet fuel in the month of October, as it will take one month to 
create the hedging position. 
This analysis will provide two hedging models for futures and two models for call 
options, both derivatives will share the same models.  The first model will show the “then 
year” cost savings or loss resulting from the hedge.  The second model will show the 
“constant year” cost savings or loss resulting from the hedge.  We will use the Gross 
Domestic Product deflator to convert the “then year” dollars to “constant year” 2000 
dollars.  We converted the hedged results into “constant year” dollars to determine the 
summation of the hedged savings or loss over the duration of the analysis.  Constant year 
2000 was chosen because the range of the fiscal years used in this analysis cover FY96 
through FY07, thereby using cost data from 1995 to 2007.   
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This hedging strategy analysis is passive, removing most of the analytical 
responsibility from the individuals who manage the Defense Working Capital Fund 
(DWCF).  The manager of the DWCF would simply assume a zero percent, 25 percent, 
50 percent, 75 percent, or 100 percent hedging position (either with futures or options) to 
cover the jet fuel procured on the domestic spot market.  By observing five different 
hedging positions one will be able to determine the best and worst possible outcomes.   
We have made no effort to determine whether the derivatives used in this analysis 
are over or under valued; the assumption is that the “invisible hand” is at work and that 
prices will change rapidly to reach equilibrium.  Utilizing this passive/automated strategy 
removes all responsibility for determining whether to initiate a contract from the analyst; 
eliminating the possibility of the DoD introducing speculation into the market because 
the analyst has such a minor role.  The only thing the analyst will have to do is to decide 
whether to execute the option or not.   
Futures Hedge Mechanics 
On the surface, a fuel hedge seems simple; a buyer purchases heating oil futures 
contracts now with the intent of selling the contracts later to protect against future price 
increases in jet fuel.  The mechanics behind the hedge are not so simple, differing slightly 
for futures and call option strategies.   
When dealing with future contracts, the hedge decision-making process is 
straightforward because the buyer has to abide by the specifications of the contract.  
Table 3 represents the mechanics of a futures hedge for this analysis.  All figures and 
amounts shown in Table 4 are to be treated as fictitious as they are not the amounts used 
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in the actual analysis.  As mentioned before, for this analysis the purchase of the heating 
oil futures contracts takes place starts on the first business day of the Fiscal Year.  
Table 3.  Hedging with Futures Scenario 
 Month Variable Jan-96 Feb-96 Mar-96 Apr-96 
JP8 Total Gallons Purchased A 84,000 126,000 168,000 126,000 
DESC Un-hedged ppg  B 0.65 0.55 0.55 0.65 
HO Futures Purchase ppg C 0.50 0.60 0.45 0.45 
HO Futures Closing ppg D 0.59 0.54 0.62 0.63 
Profit per gallon after sale D - C = E 0.09 -0.06 0.17 0.18 
Jet Fuel Spot ppg at EOM F 0.60 0.56 0.64 0.77 
Hedged Price of Jet Fuel F - E = G 0.51 0.62 0.47 0.59 
 
Using the information from Table 3, the following scenario will explain how the 
futures hedge works.  On the first business day of FY96, a buyer purchases a certain 
quantity of heating oil futures contracts for January 1996 through April 1996, at the fair 
market price (Variable C).  The buyer holds the contract until it reaches expiration and 
sells the contract at the current heating oil futures market price (Variable D).   Upon 
selling, the contract for a specific month either a gain or loss per gallon is realized 
(Variable E).  If the previous transaction realizes a profit, this amount per gallon will 
decrease the current price per gallon of jet fuel (Variable F) by the same amount leaving 
the buyer with their hedge price of jet fuel (Variable G).  Since the buyer purchased a 
certain quantity of heating oil futures, contracts the buyer can now purchase the same 
quantity of jet fuel gallons at the hedged price of jet fuel.   
Using the prices from Table 3, let us look at how the final “Hedged Price of Jet 
Fuel” came to be for January 1996.  On 1 October 1995, DESC purchased 84 thousand 
gallons worth of January 1996 heating oil future contracts at a price of 0.50 dollars per 
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gallon.  The contract expires on the last business day in January 1996; at that time, DESC 
sells the January 1996 contract for the market price.  The end of the month market price 
for heating oil is 0.59 dollars per gallon, enabling DESC to make 0.09 dollars per gallon 
profit.  Since DESC is not a profit making organization, DESC takes the 0.09 dollars per 
gallon they received off the transaction and uses it to offset the current spot price for jet 
fuel.  The spot price for jet fuel is 0.60 dollars per gallon on the last business day of 
January 1996.  DESC is able to offset this 0.60 dollar per gallon amount with 0.09 dollar 
per gallon profit it made off the futures transaction, thereby giving DESC a 0.51 dollar 
per gallon cost for jet fuel.  At this 0.51 dollar per gallon price DESC would have a total 
cost of 42,800 dollars for jet fuel if DESC hedged all of their gas consumption for the 
month of January 1996.  Note that for this scenario the un-hedge weighted average jet 
fuel price per gallon for DESC was 0.65 dollars per gallon, meaning that DESC spent 
54,600 dollars for 84 thousand gallons of jet fuel.  The un-hedged scenario uses the 
DESC weighted average jet fuel price per gallon because it most closely represents the 
actual cost that DESC had for that actual month.  
Most of the scenarios in Table 3 yield a lower hedged cost for jet fuel over the un-
hedged scenario.  If a loss occurred instead of a profit when trading the futures contracts 
for the current market value, this would force DESC to purchase jet fuel at the end of 
month spot market price.  For the month of February 1996, the purchase price for the 
futures contracts is 0.60 dollars per gallon and the closing price is 0.54 dollars per gallon, 
creating a loss of 0.06 dollars per gallon.  Adding the 0.06-dollar loss to the 0.56 dollar 
per gallon spot market price for jet fuel in February makes the total hedged cost for jet 
fuel equal 0.62 dollars per gallon.  The 0.62 dollar per gallon cost is 0.07 dollars more 
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than the 0.55 dollar per gallon historical weighted DESC price.  The total cost for the 
hedged position would be 8,820 dollars more than the historical un-hedged position.   
Call Option Hedge Mechanics 
Call options hedging strategies follow a similar methodology to hedging with 
futures but differ slightly due to the premium associated with the call option on futures 
contract.  Table 4 further depicts the call option strategy used for this analysis.   
Table 4.  Hedging with Call Option Scenario 
Month Variable Jan-96 Feb-96 Mar-96 Apr-96 
JP8 Total Gallons Purchased A 84,000 126,000 168,000 126,000 
DESC Un-hedged cost B 0.65 0.55 0.58 0.65 
HO Futures Strike ppg C 0.50 0.50 0.49 0.48 
HO Futures Settle  D 0.59 0.49 0.50 0.63 
HO Call Option Settle E 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 
HO Strike with Premium C + E = F 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.50 
Profit off of Call D – F = G 0.08 -0.01 -0.01 0.13 
Jet Fuel Spot ppg H 0.60 0.56 0.64 0.77 
Gains or Loss From Hedge H – G = I 0.52 0.57 0.65 0.64 
 
Many of the same steps from the futures hedge process hold for the call options 
strategy, but the premium does change things slightly.  To state the obvious, since the 
buyer has the option, they will only do so when it is to their advantage.  In most 
instances, when the buyer calls an option the buyer receives a profit (Variable G).  It is 
important to note that a buyer will still call an option if the loss incurred from calling the 
option is less than the cost of the premium.  The delta between the heating oil closing 
price (Variable D) and the total price of the call option (Variable F) determines the profit 
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(Variable G).  Using the profit per gallon (Variable G) to reduce the jet fuel spot price 
(Variable H) creates the final price per gallon available because of the hedge (Variable I).   
The following example of hedging with call options uses the price amounts shown 
in Table 4.  On the first day of fiscal year 1996 for the January 1996 heating oil call 
option, the strike price is 0.50 dollars per gallon and the premium is 0.01 dollars per 
gallon, providing a total cost of 0.51 dollars per gallon.  At the time of expiration, the 
January 1996 heating oil futures are trading for 0.59 dollars per gallon.  DESC would call 
the option and pay 0.51 dollars per gallon for 84,000 gallons.  DESC would then sell 
those same 84,000 gallons at the market price of 0.59 dollars per gallon, thereby making 
a 0.08 dollar per gallon profit off the sale.  DESC would then use that 0.08-dollar profit 
per gallon to offset the current market 0.60 dollar per gallon spot price for jet fuel, 
thereby giving DESC a final cost of 0.52 dollars per gallon for jet fuel.  In this scenario, it 
was in DESCs best interest to call the option but that is not always the case. 
At the time of expiration, if the price of heating oil futures is less that the total 
cost of the call option, then it is probably in DESCs best interest to let the call expire.  By 
letting the call expire, DESC forfeits the premium or settle amount associated with that 
contract.  In doing so, DESC adds the forfeited settlement amount to the jet fuel spot 
price, which creates a higher price per gallon that DESC pays due to the hedge.  Using 
the data from Table 4, for the month of February 1996, DESC would forfeit the premium 
and realize the loss.  The February 1996 strike price is 50 cents per gallon and the 
premium is 1 cent per gallon, creating a total cost of 51 cents per gallon.  At the time of 
expiration, the closing price for heating oil futures is 49 cents per gallon.  This is a 2-cent 
difference and in this instance, it would be best for DESC to let the option expire and 
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accept the 1-cent cost of the premium as a loss.  DESC would have to add that 1-cent loss 
to the spot market price of 0.56 dollars per gallon and realize a 0.57 dollar per gallon 
final cost for jet fuel for February 1996.  Since heating oil futures were less than the total 
cost of the call option for February 1996, it was in DESCs best interest to let the call 
expire.  Note, though, that this is not always the case.   
There are instances when DESC will call the option even though the futures price 
is less than the total cost of the call option.  Using the price from Table 4 for the month of 
March 1996, the strike price is 0.49 dollars per gallon and the premium is 0.02 dollars per 
gallon for call options.  This total price of 0.51 dollars per gallon is more than the 0.50 
dollar per gallon price of heating oil futures at that time.  In this case, DESC will call the 
option despite the futures price being less than the total cost of the call.  They do this 
because the delta between the total cost of the option and the futures price is 0.01 dollars 
per gallon, which is less than the 0.02 dollar per gallon premium.  By calling the option, 
DESC incurs less of a loss on the resale of the futures than if they forfeited the premium.  
Using call options can create profitable situations for the buyer as well as 
minimize financial losses.  As shown in the previous examples, call options provide the 
buyer the power of choice and can be extremely beneficial for the holder.  This power of 
choice is a luxury and comes with an additional price, but it can be worth it in the end.      
Data Analysis 
This is an ex post facto analysis; the data is analyzed to determine what the results 
would have been if the DOD had implemented a hedge position either with futures 
contracts or call options contracts on futures for heating oil at the beginning of each fiscal 
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year.  For this analysis, the purchase of all hedging contracts occurred at the beginning of 
each fiscal year.  In terms of call option contracts, this analysis will execute “at the 
money” or “in the money” contracts upon the expiration date of the contract.  This 
analysis will execute “out of the money” contracts when the loss associated with the 
execution is less than the premium cost of the option contract.    
This analysis will compare the net difference in these hedged trades on a monthly 
basis to the non-hedged results over this twelve-year period to determine potential 
savings.  The results from this methodology should reveal which hedging position (if 
any) would have provided the greatest amount of savings to DoD for that timeframe.  The 
DoD procures jet fuel constantly during the fiscal year.  Table 5 illustrates the percentage 
of DoD jet fuel purchased per month for each fiscal year. 
Table 5.  Monthly DoD Jet Fuel Procurement Percentages 
Fiscal 1st Quarter 2nd Quarter 3rd Quarter 4th Quarter 
Year Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep 
96 7.1 8.5 7.3 8.4 8.1 10.2 9.3 8.1 8.8 8.3 7.3 8.5 
97 7.6 7.9 6.9 7.1 9.0 9.1 8.6 8.2 9.0 8.5 8.6 9.7 
98 7.5 9.3 6.7 6.9 8.0 7.5 8.2 9.5 9.4 8.8 9.9 8.2 
99 7.8 7.8 8.9 7.2 7.1 8.7 9.4 8.1 9.0 8.1 9.2 8.6 
00 6.8 7.6 8.0 8.7 7.9 7.5 8.9 7.9 9.9 10.4 7.7 8.6 
01 7.9 7.2 6.9 9.2 7.2 7.8 9.4 8.9 8.3 8.1 9.6 9.5 
02 8.7 8.2 7.7 8.2 8.4 10.2 8.2 8.2 8.8 7.2 7.5 8.9 
03 9.1 6.3 9.4 8.1 9.1 7.0 7.8 9.6 7.1 8.5 9.1 8.8 
04 8.9 6.6 7.7 6.7 7.3 9.3 9.7 7.9 9.7 9.3 9.2 7.5 
05 9.5 8.5 8.6 6.8 6.6 9.6 8.1 9.9 9.3 8.2 8.2 6.7 
06 9.2 7.7 9.2 6.5 7.7 9.2 8.0 8.4 8.8 8.9 8.4 7.9 
07 6.7 7.1 7.0 9.0 7.9 9.0 7.6 9.1 9.0 10.4 8.8 8.3 
Mean 8.1 7.7 7.9 7.7 7.9 8.8 8.6 8.7 8.9 8.7 8.6 8.4 
Std Dev 1.0 0.8 1.0 1.0 0.7 1.1 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.9 0.8 0.8 
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As shown in Table 5, most of the time, the DoD roughly procures between seven 
and nine percent of its annual consumption amount of jet fuel each month.  From a 
quarterly perspective, the DoD procures roughly twenty-five percent of its annual amount 
of jet fuel each quarter, thus illustrating a relatively constant purchase stream.  This 
constant purchase stream means that the DoD can target each month equally when 
planning a hedge instead of targeting a few months for bulk purchases when creating a 
hedge. 
Using the research to show causality and to create a direct hypothesis is two of the 
most prominent difficulties of using an ex post facto experiment (Babbie, 1986).  Studies 
overcome these hurdles by limiting the subjects researched and the amount of variables 
tested.  Additionally, in ex post facto experiments based off historical numerical data, the 
experimenter can control the amount of variables used in the study to avoid these 
problems.  
Chapter Summary 
This chapter sets forth our quantitative ex-post facto methodology.  Further, we 
discussed how this analysis would deal with missing values.  In addition, we explained 
the mechanics of a fuel hedge, how it functions when using future and call option 
derivatives.  Finally, we explained the different hedging positions that were going to be 
testing in order to find which (if any) would yield the greatest savings for the DoD 
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IV.  Results and Discussion 
Chapter Overview 
The chapter reviews the results of the hedge models used in this analysis.  We will 
examine the results of the futures hedging model in “then year” and “constant year” terms 
first.  Secondly, we will assess the call option hedging model results in “then year” and 
“constant year” denominations.         
Hedging with Futures Results and Analysis 
After running the futures models, it became apparent that hedging jet fuel with 
heating oil futures would have saved the DoD money; Table 6 shows the then year results 
of this analysis.  Each hedge position in Table 6 shows the annual savings or loss realized 
after comparing the hedged amount to the historical price paid by DESC for that fiscal 
year.  Positive values in Table 6 indicate that the hedge outperformed the historic DESC 
purchase price, while negative values indicate that purchasing off of the spot market was 
a better deal for the DoD in that fiscal year.  The average savings row at the bottom of 
Table 6 is simply the average for the entire column.  The Average Savings row shows 
that even with losses over the twelve-year period the hedge position outperformed 
purchasing jet fuel off the spot market.  Over the twelve-year period used for this 
analysis, hedge positions outperformed buying off the spot market eight times, creating 
millions of dollars worth of savings.  
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Table 6.  Annual Then Year Results of Hedging with Futures 
Fiscal  Hedge Position 
Year 25% 50% 75% 100% 
96 $41,598,030 $83,196,061 $124,794,091 $166,392,122 
97 $12,024,421 $24,048,843 $36,073,264 $48,097,686 
98 -$43,277,592 -$86,555,184 -$129,832,776 -$173,110,368 
99 -$3,732,707 -$7,465,415 -$11,198,122 -$14,930,830 
00 $87,226,900 $174,453,800 $261,680,700 $348,907,600 
01 $2,504,828 $5,009,656 $7,514,484 $10,019,312 
02 -$7,279,629 -$14,559,259 -$21,838,888 -$29,118,518 
03 $35,604,752 $71,209,503 $106,814,255 $142,419,007 
04 $103,349,627 $206,699,253 $310,048,880 $413,398,507 
05 $112,022,366 $224,044,732 $336,067,098 $448,089,464 
06 -$31,885,395 -$63,770,790 -$95,656,185 -$127,541,580 
07 $1,445,364 $2,890,729 $4,336,093 $5,781,458 
Avg. Savings $25,800,080 $51,600,161 $77,400,241 $103,200,322 
   
According to the model, the greater the hedge position the higher the savings for 
the DoD.  In then-year terms, on average the DoD could have realized a 103.2 million 
dollar savings per year had it hedged all of its jet fuel purchases over the twelve-year 
period.  It is important to note that in this model the DoD would have realized losses in 
FY98, FY99, FY02 and FY06 had it taken any hedging position.  The impacts of these 
losses are better understood in the Constant Year model, Table 7.    .   
Table 7 shows the results of Table 6 in constant year 2000 dollars.  As mentioned 
in Chapter 3, we used the gross domestic product deflator to convert the values from 
Table 6 into constant year 2000 dollars.  Since all of the values are now the same constant 
year 2000 denomination, Table 7 adds a total row to the analysis.  With the total row 
added, we can now show how much money the DoD could have saved over the twelve-
year period had it hedged with futures.  
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Table 7.  Annual Constant Year 2000 Results of Hedging with Futures 
Fiscal  Hedge Position 
Year 25% 50% 75% 100% 
96 $45,163,215 $90,326,429 $135,489,644 $180,652,859 
97 $12,812,110 $25,624,220 $38,436,330 $51,248,440 
98 -$45,357,696 -$90,715,392 -$136,073,088 -$181,430,784 
99 -$3,869,213 -$7,738,427 -$11,607,640 -$15,476,853 
00 $89,127,089 $178,254,179 $267,381,268 $356,508,358 
01 $2,504,828 $5,009,656 $7,514,484 $10,019,312 
02 -$7,109,083 -$14,218,165 -$21,327,248 -$28,436,330 
03 $34,173,891 $68,347,782 $102,521,673 $136,695,564 
04 $97,129,456 $194,258,913 $291,388,369 $388,517,825 
05 $102,339,045 $204,678,091 $307,017,136 $409,356,182 
06 -$28,208,676 -$56,417,352 -$84,626,028 -$112,834,704 
07 $1,238,785 $2,477,569 $3,716,354 $4,955,139 
Total $299,943,752 $599,887,503 $899,831,255 $1,199,775,007 
Avg. Savings $24,995,313 $49,990,625 $74,985,938 $99,981,251 
 
On average, over the twelve-year period the DoD could have saved roughly 100 
million dollars per year on jet fuel had it hedged 100 percent of its’ domestic fuel 
purchases.  In addition, the DoD could have saved 1.2 billion dollars over the twelve-year 
period had it hedged all of its’ jet fuel expense with heating oil futures.  Hedging with 
futures would have yielded positive results 8 out of the possible 12 years used in this 
analysis.  The largest loss occurred in FY98, in the 100 percent hedge scenario this would 
have been a loss of 181 million dollars.  The greatest savings was realized in FY05, for 
the 100 percent scenario this savings totaled to 409 million dollar for the DoD.  The total 
savings achieved would be more than enough to pay any additional overhead costs 
realized in order to execute the strategy.     
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Hedging with Call Options Results and Analysis 
The call option models provided positive results as well; Table 8 shows the results 
of this analysis. Over the twelve-year period used for this analysis, hedge positions 
outperformed the historical DESC purchase price in every fiscal year.   
Table 8.  Annual Then Year Results of Hedging with Call Options 
Fiscal  Hedge Position 
Year 25% 50% 75% 100% 
96 $28,877,788 $57,755,576 $86,633,364 $115,511,152 
96 $8,929,925 $17,859,850 $26,789,775 $35,719,700 
96 $10,199,133 $20,398,265 $30,597,398 $40,796,531 
96 $15,362,713 $30,725,427 $46,088,140 $61,450,854 
00 $58,131,251 $116,262,502 $174,393,753 $232,525,004 
01 $3,003,746 $6,007,491 $9,011,237 $12,014,982 
02 $3,884,655 $7,769,309 $11,653,964 $15,538,618 
03 $18,305,421 $36,610,842 $54,916,263 $73,221,684 
04 $103,805,624 $207,611,248 $311,416,872 $415,222,495 
05 $106,791,151 $213,582,302 $320,373,453 $427,164,604 
06 $18,583,369 $37,166,739 $55,750,108 $74,333,478 
07 $22,841,801 $45,683,603 $68,525,404 $91,367,206 
Avg Savings $33,226,381 $66,452,763 $99,679,144 $132,905,526 
 
Once again, the greater the hedge positions the higher the savings for the DoD.  In 
then-year terms, on average the DoD could have realized a 132.9 million dollar savings 
per year had it hedged all of its jet fuel purchases over the twelve-year period.     
Table 9 shows the results of Table 8 in constant year 2000 dollars.  Table 9 is 
similar to Table 7 in that it uses the GDP deflator to convert the then year dollars into 
constant year terms and it has a total row at the bottom of the table.  Therefore, all of the 
results of this analysis are in constant year 2000 dollars.   
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Table 9.  Annual Constant Year 2000 Results of Hedging with Call Options 
Fiscal  Hedge Position 
Year 25% 50% 75% 100% 
96 $31,352,776 $62,705,552 $94,058,328 $125,411,104 
96 $9,514,901 $19,029,803 $28,544,704 $38,059,605 
96 $10,689,346 $21,378,692 $32,068,038 $42,757,384 
96 $15,924,531 $31,849,062 $47,773,593 $63,698,124 
00 $59,397,608 $118,795,216 $178,192,824 $237,590,432 
01 $3,003,746 $6,007,491 $9,011,237 $12,014,982 
02 $3,793,645 $7,587,290 $11,380,935 $15,174,580 
03 $17,569,774 $35,139,549 $52,709,323 $70,279,098 
04 $97,558,009 $195,116,018 $292,674,027 $390,232,036 
05 $97,560,022 $195,120,044 $292,680,065 $390,240,087 
06 $16,440,513 $32,881,026 $49,321,539 $65,762,052 
07 $19,577,121 $39,154,242 $58,731,362 $78,308,483 
Total $382,381,992 $764,763,984 $1,147,145,976 $1,529,527,968 
Avg Savings $31,865,166 $63,730,332 $95,595,498 $127,460,664 
 
On average, over the twelve-year period the DoD could have saved 127.5 million 
dollars per year on jet fuel had it hedged 100 percent of its’ domestic fuel purchases.  
This analysis also shows that the DoD could have saved 1.5 billion dollars over the 
twelve-year period had it hedged all of its jet fuel expense with heating oil call options.  
For the timeframe of this analysis, the DoD would have had positive returns for each FY.  
The smallest savings occurred in FY02, in the 100 percent hedge scenario the savings 
would have been a loss of 12 million dollars.  The 100 percent hedge returned provided 
two year that realized 390.2 million dollars in savings.  The savings realized would easily 
offset any additional cost realized by hiring the personal to implement the hedge or the 
transaction costs associated with the trade.    
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Both derivatives returned positive results for the DoD, with options 
outperforming futures by nearly 300 million dollars over the 12 year period.  Future 
contracts have the potential to create the largest savings for the DoD but, they also come 
with the greatest amount of risk.  Bearing that in mind, futures seem to be a good 
selection for a customer who is “risk loving”.  Options on the other hand are more 
appropriate for a customer who is risk adverse and as shown in the analysis, the payoffs 
are not as big but neither are the losses.  The DoD in general is not a “risk loving” 
organization and tends to be risk adverse.  This risk adverse mentality makes call options 
the ideal tool for the DoD to use when implementing a fuel hedge. 
It is important to note that the results of this analysis reflect a timeframe in which 
the price of crude oil was generally rising.  This upward trend in price undoubtedly 
affected the results of hedging with futures and options in a positive manner and needs to 
be recognized.  However, since September 2008, the crude oil market has experienced a 
downward trend in price and this negative trend would affect the performance of hedging 
with each derivative differently.  Buyers that used heating oil futures to make their hedge 
would be held to the purchase price of the heating oil futures contract and pay the agreed 
upon amount.  Heating Oil futures closed for 2.84 dollars per gallon on 1 October 2008 
and as of 18 February 2009, the price for heating oil futures is 1.14 dollars per gallon.  
Using futures in this instance would have cost a buyer 1.70 dollars more per gallon than 
simply purchasing fuel off the spot market.  As we know, a buyer using options on the 
other hand would simply let their call expire and pay their premium.  In the end, the call 
option buyer still benefits because the price of jet fuel has decreased with the price of 
crude oil and they are now paying a lower price for fuel than they had planned.  Large 
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negative price trends are rare for a high demand limited supply item such as crude oil.  
Negative price trends are not necessarily a bad thing, depending on the derivative used 
for creating a hedge, as one can still benefit from the price decline if options are used to 
create the hedge.      
Options are the best selection for the DoD, but future contracts should not be 
completely ignored when creating a hedge.  Undoubtedly, using an optimal mixture of 
options and futures to create the fuel hedge would be the dominant hedging strategy.  
This analysis looked at the market volatility in an attempt to uncover a pattern that would 
suggest using one derivative over the other.     
Market Volatility Analysis 
  The premise for this analysis is that when faced with certain levels of market 
volatility one derivative would be preferential over the other for hedging.  One 
characteristic of market volatility is the variance in price for that month.  A large variance 
in price would indicate a highly volatile market for that month while a small variance in 
price would indicate a less volatile market.     
This analysis used daily data obtained from the EIA to determine the monthly 
variance in price for heating oil futures from October 1995 to September 2007.  The 
monthly variance in price was tested to see how strongly correlated it was with results 
from hedging with option and futures for the corresponding month.  The results from this 
analysis indicate that there is a weak correlation between both of the derivatives and the 
variance in price.  The correlation factor between price variance and the results from 
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hedging with futures was 0.2496, while the correlation factor between price variance and 
the results for hedging with options was 0.2495.   
Unfortunately, both of these correlation factors are weak and do not shed any 
additional light on the topic.  In the end, price variance did not seem to matter when it 
came to derivative performance, even in the later years of the analysis when market 
volatility drove up the cost of call option premiums.      
Quantity Hedged  
  Providing jet fuel price stability is the target goal of this analysis.  With the 
positive results in hand, it is now time to determine how much fuel the DoD should 
hedge.  To make this determination we are going to compare the results from hedging 
with futures and options to the projected DESC fuel cost for each FY used in this 
analysis.  For this analysis the projected DESC cost will simply be the DESC standard 
price that is set at the beginning of the FY multiplied by the quantity of gallons purchased 
for the corresponding FY.  By subtracting the cost for each hedge position from the 
projected DESC cost we will be able to determine if that hedge position would be 
sufficient in covering the projected DESC cost for the FY.  Results from this analysis for 
futures are shown in Table 10.   
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Table 10.  Future Hedge Position Cost vs Projected DESC Cost 
Fiscal  Hedge Position 
Year 25% 50% 75% 100% 
96  $    657,300,657   $    698,898,687   $ 740,496,718   $ 782,094,748  
96  $    184,865,851   $    196,890,272   $ 208,914,694   $ 220,939,115  
96  $ 1,069,201,029   $ 1,025,923,437   $ 982,645,845   $ 939,368,253  
96  $    885,111,024   $    881,378,316   $ 877,645,609   $ 873,912,901  
00  $      52,608,584   $    139,835,484   $ 227,062,384   $ 314,289,284  
01  $    664,286,097   $    666,790,925   $ 669,295,754   $ 671,800,582  
02  $    597,460,198   $    590,180,568   $ 582,900,939   $ 575,621,310  
03  $      22,772,726   $      58,377,477   $   93,982,229   $ 129,586,981  
04  $  (159,244,520)  $    (55,894,893)  $   47,454,734   $ 150,804,361  
05  $  (269,040,607)  $  (157,018,241)  $ (44,995,875)  $   67,026,491  
06  $    156,773,040   $    124,887,645   $   93,002,250   $   61,116,855  
07  $    489,418,720   $    490,864,085   $ 492,309,449   $ 493,754,813  
Avg Savings  $    362,626,067   $    388,426,147   $ 414,226,227   $ 440,026,308  
 
Positive numbers indicate that hedge position was sufficient in covering the 
projected DESC cost for that FY while negative numbers indicate the contrary.  The 
results of this analysis indicate that hedging 100 percent of the domestic fuel purchase 
with futures would have been sufficient each year to cover the projected DESC cost.  The 
100 percent hedge position was able to consistently outperform the projected DESC cost 
in this analysis because the DESC standard price for jet fuel was higher than the spot 
market price that was used for the results in Table 6.  Therefore, even though the costs for 
the 100 percent hedging position were higher than the market price, they were still lower 
than the projected DESC cost.  The results from this analysis for the call option model are 
shown in Table 11.   
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Table 11.  Call Option Hedge Position Cost vs Projected DESC Cost 
      Fiscal  Hedge Position 
Year 25% 50% 75% 100% 
96  $    644,580,414   $    673,458,202   $    702,335,990   $    731,213,778  
96  $    181,771,354   $    190,701,279   $    199,631,205   $    208,561,130  
96  $ 1,122,677,754   $ 1,132,876,887   $ 1,143,076,019   $ 1,153,275,152  
96  $    904,206,444   $    919,569,158   $    934,931,871   $    950,294,585  
00  $      23,512,935   $      81,644,186   $    139,775,437   $    197,906,688  
01  $    664,785,015   $    667,788,760   $    670,792,506   $    673,796,252  
02  $    608,624,482   $    612,509,136   $    616,393,791   $    620,278,446  
03  $        5,473,395   $      23,778,816   $      42,084,237   $      60,389,658  
04  $  (158,788,522)  $    (54,982,899)  $      48,822,725   $    152,628,349  
05  $  (274,271,822)  $  (167,480,671)  $    (60,689,519)  $      46,101,632  
06  $    207,241,804   $    225,825,174   $    244,408,543   $    262,991,913  
07  $    510,815,157   $    533,656,959   $    556,498,760   $    579,340,561  
Avg Savings  $    370,052,368   $    403,278,749   $    436,505,130   $    469,731,512  
 
The results from this analysis are similar to the futures results in that only 100 
percent hedge position consistently outperforms the projected DESC cost.  Both 
comparison models show consistent average savings and indicate that either derivative 
could be used to provide stable fuel costs for the DoD.      
Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, we showed that hedging with both types of derivatives would have 
provided savings for the DoD.  In comparison, call options provided a larger savings for 
the DoD than the futures did over the twelve-year period.  Specifically, in constant year 
terms hedging with call options averaged nearly 27.5 million dollars per year more than 
hedging with futures.  Additionally, the call option model grossed nearly 300 million 
more in savings than the futures model over the twelve-year period.        
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V.  Conclusions 
Explanation of the Problem 
Since 2003, the price of jet fuel has been very volatile and difficult for OMB to 
forecast accurately.  These two factors have created an environment in which a DESC 
standard price for jet fuel is not stable.  With the component services relying heavily on 
the DESC standard price for budgetary purposes, changes to the standard price during the 
fiscal year creates financial havoc for the DoD.  These times of financial hardship force 
the services to seek supplemental funding from congress to stay mission ready.   The 
models provided in this paper offer a “what if” the DoD had entered into a fuel hedge 
analysis.  This analysis provides DoD leadership with sound historical based analysis to 
support the use of implementing a fuel hedging position to mitigate financial losses due 
to increasing jet fuel prices.  This mitigation of financial loss will help alleviate the 
financial drain placed on the DESC and enable the creation of a stable standard price for 
jet fuel.   
Restatement of Results 
The results of this analysis indicated that the DoD would benefit from undertaking 
a hedging position by realizing a reduction in cost for jet fuel purchases.  Overall both 
derivative instruments yielded positive results but the call option models constantly 
delivered positive returns for the DoD, indicating that call options are the dominant 
hedging instrument between the two selections.  The DoD should consider utilizing either 
of the aforementioned derivatives to create a fuel hedge for future use.    
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Recommendations 
We recommend that the DoD consider a pilot program that uses call options to 
hedge a portion of their jet fuel expense.  Since this would be a pilot program, we 
recommend that the DoD hedge 25 percent of its domestic fuel consumption in order to 
test the viability of the program.  This 25 percent hedge would only be equal to roughly 
12.5 percent of the DoDs total jet fuel consumption because DESC only purchases 
roughly 50 percent of DoDs fuel on the domestic market.  Although the results of this 
analysis indicate that only the 100 percent hedge position consistently outperform the 
projected DESC cost, it is our belief that the DWCF would sustain the minor losses that 
occur in the 25 percent hedge position.  With all of the data available from this pilot 
program, the DoD would be in a better position to determine if they wanted to continue 
with the hedging program or in-fact increase the size of the hedge to reduce their 
exposure even further for future purchases. 
Limitations 
There are several limitations to using an ex post facto analysis.  Making a causal 
statement between the implementation of a fuel hedging position and budgetary stability 
for the DoD is one of those limitations.  Past performance in no way predicts future 
results.  Over the twelve year period of this analysis, hedging positions based off futures 
and call options yielded financial savings for the DoD, but this does not mean these type 
of hedging positions will always create financial savings in the future.  The price of jet 
fuel tracks the price of crude oil and the only thing that has been consistent about the 
price of crude is that it is constantly changing.  As fast as the price of oil rose from 2003 
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to 2008, it fell even faster in late 2008 by dropping nearly 100 dollars per barrel in three 
months.  This rapid decrease in price could have created a situation in which a fuel hedge 
based off either derivative would return a loss for the DoD.   
Another important item to note in this analysis is that when hedging using 
options, in no case was 100 percent of the data available to create a historical hedge 
based solely off call options.  As mentioned earlier, this analysis used the closest strike 
price to the “at the money” position to create the hedge.   However, there were instances 
when no strike price available for a month and the analysis used the historical DESC 
weighted price for those occurrences.  Despite these shortcomings, the data clearly 
indicates that a passive hedging strategy using futures or call options would have 
produced positive results over the twelve-year period.      
Recommendations for Future Research 
The results of this research are very self-explanatory and leave little room for 
additional research except for two areas.  A thorough evaluation of the federal laws that 
govern or restrict this type of program is required.  This paper identified the major legal 
obstacle preventing the DoD from implementing a hedging program but, it did not cover 
the matter in extensive legal detail.  With the positive results of this research in hand, a 
focused look into the legal matter is justified.   
Additional research is needed to uncover the optimal mixture of derivatives to be 
used when creating a fuel hedge for the DoD.  Similar to an investment portfolio, a fuel 
hedge should have some diversity.  This diversity could involve using call option and 
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futures contracts based off of heating oil and crude oil.  The commercial sector uses both 
commodities to create fuel hedges and this avenue could be explored for the DoD as well.     
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